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This paper evaluates donor performance by using data on aid for 10 sectors that are closely
related to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). We utilize the MDGs indicators to
measure the recipient’s need for aid in each sector and investigate whether donors designate
aid for speciﬁc sectors in the countries that need it most. Our results suggest that the
majority of donors are selective in all the sectors. Not only the Nordic countries but also
other large donors are selective and have a clear tendency to allocate more assistance to poor
countries.
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 1 Introduction
Recently the quality of foreign aid has been under severe scrutiny. Since it is not easy for donor
countries to increase the amount of aid to developing countries, the issue is what kind of aid can
contribute to poverty reduction and under what conditions aid can be eﬀective. Burnside and
Dollar (2000) suggest that the impact of aid on growth is positive only if recipients have good
policies.1 Although recent studies such as Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Easterly et al. (2004) ﬁnd
that the results of Burnside and Dollar (2000) are not robust, their paper is inﬂuential.2 There
is a general acceptance among practitioners and policy-makers that policies and institutions
matter. Accordingly, many papers on the pattern of aid allocation examine whether donors are
selective on policy. For example, recent studies such as Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Dollar
and Levin (2004) investigate whether the pattern of aid allocation by each donor depends on
policy as well as poverty.
Several studies have evaluated donor performance. Most of them examine the determinants
of aid allocation across countries, and appreciate donors if their assistance is targeted to poor
countries or countries with good policies and institutions because aid is supposed to be eﬀective
in those countries. Alesina and Dollar (2000) investigate the determinants of aid across countries
and show that the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) and the
United States are selective on poverty while aid by France and Japan has little relationship
to poverty. Dollar and Levin (2004) estimate donors’ poverty and policy selectivity indices
(elasticity of aid with respect to the recipient’s per capita GDP and index of good policies,
respectively). They suggest that Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Ireland and
the Netherlands are policy- and poverty-selective while large donors such as France and the
United States are not particularly selective (Japan is selective only on policy). Roodman (2006)
also appreciates the Scandinavian countries and has a low opinion of Japanese and U.S. aid.3
Sawada et al. (2007) found that Canada, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and
the United Kingdom are poverty-selective. Overall, recent empirical studies suggest that the
1See also Collier and Dollar (2002) for the aid-policy link.
2See also Roodman (2004) for the robustness of the aid-policy link.
3Roodman (2006) developed an index of donor performance. He penalizes tied aid, project proliferation, and
low policy and poverty selectivity.
2Scandinavian countries are poverty-selective while the results for the large donors in absolute
terms such as Japan and the United States are mixed.
It is likely that using aggregate aid is (at least partially) responsible for the mixed results.
There are many kinds of aid projects and clearly all the projects are not the same; some donors
focus on poverty reduction while others allocate resources to combat AIDS and other diseases.
Hence, to conduct proper evaluations, it is important to take into account diﬀerences in the
purposes of aid. All of the studies above examine the allocation of aggregate aid across coun-
tries and do not consider diﬀerences in aid projects although some of them take into account
diﬀerences in aid modality (grant, loan, technical assistance, bilateral, multilateral, and so on).4
More importantly, examining whether donors are selective on poverty and policy is not enough
to conduct proper evaluations. It is important to know whether donors designate aid for speciﬁc
sectors in the countries that need it most. Although this information is essential to improving
the quality of aid, it has been neglected in the literature. Note that giving aid to the poorest
countries does not necessarily imply giving aid to countries that need it most. For example, in
Zimbabwe, poverty rates and prevalence of HIV are extremely high while they have relatively
good access to safe drinking water, good primary education, and low levels of CO2 emissions.
These facts imply that they need aid for HIV control most but aid for water supply, educa-
tion, and environmental protection less. In this case, examining whether donors are selective on
poverty is not enough.
Projects (recipients and sectors) are supposed to be selected appropriately. However, it is
not always the case. The question is: what is appropriate (high-quality) aid? In this paper, we
suppose that aid in a given sector is appropriate if a donor gives aid to a country that needs it
most. We examine whether a donor’s aid for a sector is associated with the recipient’s need in
the sector. In other words, we investigate aid allocation across countries for each sector.5 Then,
the next question is how we measure the recipient’s need for aid in a sector. To answer this
question, we use the indicators for monitoring progress in the Millennium Development Goals
4One recent exception is Clemens et al. (2004). They divide aid into three categories such as short-impact aid,
long-impact aid and humanitarian aid, and show that short-impact aid has a large eﬀect on growth.
5It is also possible to examine aid allocation across sectors for a given recipient. However, in this paper we
limit the discussion to aid allocation across countries.
3(MDGs), which state the world’s most pressing development challenges. Since all the donors
recognize the importance of the MDGs, it is appropriate to focus on the MDGs and use their
indicators to measure the need for aid in each sector.
We evaluate donor performance as follows. For example, an indicator that measures the
need for aid in education is school enrollment ratio (from Target 3 in the MDGs). We suppose
that, if a country has a low school enrollment ratio, this country needs aid for education. We
examine whether a donor’s aid for education is associated with the recipient’s school enrollment
ratio. We appreciate the donor when we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association between the amount of aid
for the sector and the indicator in the MDGs. The next section details how to evaluate donor
performance.
2 Assessment procedure
We evaluate donor performance and reveal which donors give high-quality aid for which sector.
We suppose that good donors designate aid for speciﬁc sectors in the countries that need it
most. That is, each donor should allocate a ﬁxed aid budget for purpose p among recipients





aidr · total aid for purpose p (1)
and needr = N(aidr;envr) > 0 where needr is recipient r’s need for sector p, F( ) represents the
aggregate measure of need for p, envr denotes the exogenous environment for recipient r and aidr
is aid for recipient r. We assume that needr depends on envr but aidr can improve the condition
of the recipient (@N=@aidr < 0). We also assume that @F=@needr > 0, @2F=@need2
r > 0, and
the second-order condition is satisﬁed.6 In this case, other things equal, more aid reduces
the marginal beneﬁt of aid and the marginal beneﬁt becomes large for a recipient with a worse
environment; the absolute value of @F=@needr is large when the recipient with a bad environment
6See Sawada et al. (2007) for a similar optimization problem of donors with a speciﬁc functional form for F( ).
In their model, F( ) is the measure of global poverty.
4feels a desperate need for aid. The ﬁrst-order condition for an interior solution implies that the
marginal impact of aid on F( ) is equalized across recipients. It suggests that ideal donors give
aid to the countries that need it most; more aid to a recipient with a worse environment. Thus,
aid for p should be associated with the recipient’s needs for the sector.
Using data on each donor’s aid for each purpose and indicators that measure the recipient’s
need for aid for each purpose, we estimate
aidr;p;t
aidp;t
= ¯0 + ¯1 ln
Ã
1 +




+ ¯3 lnpopulationr;t + ¯4democracyr;t + cr + er;t (2)
where er;t is an error term and cr represents the cluster eﬀect (intragroup correlation). The
dependent variable is the ratio of aid to recipient r for purpose p in period t to total aid
for purpose p in that period. This ratio is explained by four variables as discussed below.
Since, in reality, a donor does not necessarily give aid to all the countries, there are many
cases where the dependent variable is zero. Since the amount of aid commitments cannot be
negative (observations of aid at or below zero are censored), we employ the standard Tobit
model to estimate (2). To address the potential endogeneity problem, we use lagged values of
the explanatory variables as instruments (we use lagged values of the index and income if both
are available). Moreover, to adjust standard errors for intragroup correlation, we consider the
unobserved cluster eﬀect (cr) in the estimation.
The ﬁrst two explanatory variables in (2) represent the recipient’s need and play the key
role in evaluating donor performance. The ﬁrst variable represents recipient r’s need for aid for
purpose p: index(p)r;t is the environment for recipient r in period t measured by the indicator
that corresponds to purpose p; index(p) represents the worst environment for all r and t mea-
sured by the corresponding indicator. If p represents education, then index(p) can be school
enrollment and small values correspond to bad environments. If p represents HIV/AIDS control,
then index(p) can be HIV prevalence and high values correspond to bad environments. (Data
Appendix C lists purpose codes and the corresponding indicators.) This variable becomes 0 for
5the recipient with index(p)r;t = index(p) and positive if index(p)r;t 6= index(p). This implies
that, if the donor gives more aid to countries with worse environments, ¯1 is negative. The
second variable is the level of income for recipient r in period t. It also represents the recipient’s
need for aid (aid should be directed to impoverished countries regardless of purpose). As in
Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Dollar and Levin (2004), we use GDP per capita to examine
whether donors focus on poor countries. As in the ﬁrst variable, income levels are measured by
deviations from the worst environment. We appreciate donors if they have signiﬁcantly negative
¯1 and ¯2.
We also consider two control variables. We follow the literature and include the log of
population of recipient r in the initial year of period t (lnpopulationr;t) from the World Bank’s
World Development Indicators (WDI). In the previous studies, the estimated coeﬃcients suggest
that donors allocate less aid per capita as the size of the recipient country’s population increases
(Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Levin and Dollar, 2005; Sawada et al., 2007). We also include the
political rights index of recipient r in the initial year of period t (democracyr;t) from Freedom
House as in Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Sawada et al. (2007) to capture the eﬀect of increasing
selectivity.7 This index can capture the potential eﬀects of a tendency to allocate more assistance
to countries with good governance, as discussed in Dollar and Levin (2004).
We use project-level data on aid from the OECD’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS), which
reports aid commitments for over 200 distinct purposes for all donors and recipients annually
since 1973. As we will see, we use data on aid for 10 groups of purposes and for 7 ﬁve-year
periods (before 1975, 1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004). Un-
fortunately, data on indicators over time are not available in many cases. For example, data on
HIV prevalence are available only for the period 2000-2004. Note that the sample of recipient
countries is not identical across donors. As shown in Alesina and Dollar (2000), the direction of
aid is dictated by political and strategic considerations (e.g., colonial past and political alliances).
We exclude from the sample countries that have never received aid from the donor.
To estimate (2), we use indicators that measure the recipient’s need for aid in each sector.
7The data are obtained from http://www.freedomhouse.org. The political rights index ranges from 1 (best)
to 7 (worst).
6Since there are more than 200 purpose codes in the CRS, it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd appropriate
indicators for each of the sectors. A more practical method would be to choose a set of important
sectors such as food, education and health care. In this paper, we focus on the targets in the
MDGs because all donors recognize the importance of the MDGs and also because each of the
targets in the MDGs has indicators to monitor the progress. These indicators measure the
recipient’s need for aid in each sector. It is diﬃcult to use some of the targets in the MDGs:
the indicators for Targets 11, 16 and 17 are not available for many countries; the indicators
for Targets 12-15 (Goal 8) measure the donor’s eﬀorts but do not reﬂect the recipient’s need
for aid.8 Accordingly, using 11 targets as listed in Data Appendix B and their indicators, we
examine the following sectors: 1) Food; 2) Health; 3) Water supply and sanitation; 4) Basic
nutrition; 5) Basic education; 6) Women in development; 7) STD control including HIV/AIDS;
8) Infectious disease control; 9) General environmental protection; 10) Telecommunications. For
each of the sectors, we have several MDGs indicators that measure the recipient’s need. Instead
of trying to ﬁnd the most appropriate one for each sector, we use all the indicators one at a time
and examine whether aid is responsive to at least one of the indicators. Data Appendix C lists
the CRS codes for the 10 sectors and the corresponding indicators.
Note that the ﬁrst target of the MDGs is poverty reduction and the target has several
poverty indices such as headcount ratio and poverty gap ratio. Since the elimination of poverty
is the ultimate goal, aid should be directed to impoverished countries regardless of purpose. To
examine whether donors are selective on poverty, we should use these poverty indices. However,
this reduces the sample size considerably. Hence, we instead use GDP per capita, PPP (constant
2000 international dollars) from WDI. Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Dollar and Levin (2004)
also use GDP per capita to examine poverty selectivity. Moreover, many empirical studies
suggest that increases in income per capita are associated with reductions in poverty (Ravallion,
1995; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Besley and Burgess, 2003). Thus, it seems reasonable to use GDP
per capita as a measure of poverty.
8See http://devdata.worldbank.org/gmis/mdg/list of goals.htm for details of the MDGs.
73 Results
3.1 Estimation results for major donors
Table 1 lists the ﬁve largest donors for each purpose and each donor’s share in total bilateral aid.
The table shows that the ﬁve largest donors account for 60 percent to 92 percent of total aid in
each sector. Hence, the selectivity of these donors can aﬀect the overall eﬀectiveness of aid for
each sector. As shown in the bottom row of Table 1, the share of each sector in total aid ranges
from 0.1 to 5.5. Aid for these 10 sectors, which are closely related to the MDGs, covers about
18 percent of total bilateral aid.9 Tables 2-11 show the estimation results for the ﬁve largest
donors in each sector. Note that each table reports the coeﬃcient on one of the indicators that
measure the need for the sector (as in Data Appendix C, there are several indicators for each
sector).
Table 2 shows that malnutrition has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on aid for food by the
United States, Japan and Canada. The results imply that these donors give more aid for food
to countries with more malnourished children (note that all the indicators including GDP per
capita are measured by deviations from the worst environment). If we use GDP per capita as a
measure of the recipient’s need, then we can conclude that the other two large donors are also
selective. Hence, the results in Table 2 suggest that the large donors that account for more than
90 percent of aid for food are selective.
Table 3 shows that infant mortality (deviations from the worst environment) has a signiﬁ-
cantly negative eﬀect on aid for health by the United States. The results imply that only the
United States gives more aid for health to countries with high rates of infant mortality. The
coeﬃcients on GDP per capita suggest that Japan, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands
are also selective (if we use other indicators as a regressor, France are also selective as shown in
Table 12). Thus, the results in Table 3 suggest that the large donors that account for 60 percent
of aid for health are selective.
Table 4 shows that aid for water supply and sanitation is not negatively related to improved
9As the CRS codes suggest, aid for basic health (column 1) includes aid for basic nutrition (column 4) and aid
for infectious disease control (column 8).
8water source. Using the other indicator (sanitation facilities) does not alter the results qualita-
tively. These results imply that none of the major donors are selective on the recipient’s need for
water supply and sanitation although the coeﬃcients on GDP per capita suggest that Germany,
the United States and the Netherlands are selective.
Table 5 shows that malnutrition (deviations from the worst environment) has a signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect on aid for basic nutrition by the Netherlands and Japan. The results imply that
these donors give more aid for basic nutrition to countries with more malnourished children.
The coeﬃcients on GDP per capita suggest that the United States is also selective. Aid by these
three donors accounts for more than 60 percent of aid for this sector.
Table 6 shows that aid for basic education is not negatively related to school enrollment.
Using the other two indicators (persistence to grade 5 and literacy rate) does not alter the results
qualitatively. These results imply that none of the major donors are sensitive to the indicators.10
However, the coeﬃcients on GDP per capita suggest that all the donors are selective.
Table 7 shows that aid for women in development is not negatively related to the ratio
of girls to boys in school. Using the other two indicators (ratio of young literate females to
males and seats held by women in national parliament) does not alter the results qualitatively.
These results imply that none of the major donors are sensitive to the indicators. However, the
coeﬃcients on GDP per capita suggest that all the donors are selective.
Table 8 shows that HIV prevalence (deviations from the worst environment) has a signiﬁ-
cantly negative eﬀect on aid for STD control including HIV/AIDS by all ﬁve donors. The results
imply that these donors (the aid from which accounts for more than 80 percent of aid for this
sector) are selective. Hence, we can conclude that aid for this sector meets the recipient’s needs.
Table 9 shows that incidence of tuberculosis (deviations from the worst environment) has
a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on aid for infectious disease control by all major donors except
Germany. The coeﬃcients on GDP per capita suggest that all the donors are sensitive to income
levels. The results imply that these donors (the aid from which accounts for more than 70 percent
10The insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients may suggest that the indicators do not necessarily reﬂect the recipient’s need for
education. The insigniﬁcant or positive eﬀect of school enrollment in Table 3 may be due to selection bias (in the
case where data on education is available only for countries with high education levels). However, the indicators
for education levels are available for many countries and there is no evidence of the selection bias.
9of aid for this sector) are selective.
Table 10 shows that aid for general environmental protection is not negatively related to
GDP per unit of energy use. Using the other two indicators (forest area and CO2 emissions)
does not alter the results qualitatively. These results imply that none of the donors are sensitive
to the indicators. However, the coeﬃcients on GDP per capita suggest that all the donors except
Japan are selective.
Table 11 shows that telephone mainlines have a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on aid for
telecommunications by France. The coeﬃcients on GDP per capita suggest that Japan, Ger-
many and Canada are sensitive to income levels. These results suggest that the large donors
that account for more than 70 percent of aid for telecommunications are selective.
Tables 2-11 also demonstrate that the two control variables have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on
aid as in the literature. The recipient’s population size has a signiﬁcantly positive but small
eﬀect in most cases; a one-percent increase in population size leads to a less than one-percent
increase in aid. These small coeﬃcients reﬂect the small country bias. The political rights
index has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect for Canada (in Tables 2, 9 and 11), Japan (in Table
6), the Netherlands (in Tables 4, 6, 8 and 10), Sweden (in Table 8), the United Kingdom (in
Table 3) and the United States (in Tables 2-5 and 8-10). The results suggest that these donors
are selective on policy and institutions in the sense that they give less aid to less democratic
countries. The results are consistent with the policy elasticities in Dollar and Levin’s (2004)
Table 9.
3.2 Donor performance
Finally, we evaluate donor performance by investigating which donors are selective in which
sectors. We estimate equation (2) using each of the MDGs indicators in Data Appendix C. Table
12 shows the results for all the 10 sectors; “A” represents ¯1 < 0 (at the 10 percent signiﬁcance
level) for at least one indicator and “B” represents ¯2 < 0 when none of the indicators shows
that ¯1 is signiﬁcantly negative (that is, donors with B are selective at least on income levels).
Table 12 demonstrates that for all the sectors at least half of the donors are selective. However,
10there are few As for some sectors. This may suggest that the indicators are not relevant; for
example, the indicators such as forest area may not necessarily reﬂect the recipient’s need for
environmental protection.
Table 12 shows that Switzerland, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Norway and the United
States have more than four As. Since each donor has 2.9 As on average, these donors are
relatively selective. If we take into account the number of Bs as well, then Canada, Germany,
Denmark, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Italy are selective in more than nine sectors (7.7
sectors on average). Previous studies such as Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Dollar and Levin
(2004) suggest that the Nordic countries allocate more assistance to poor countries while the
results for large donors are mixed. Our results from sectoral data show that not only the Nordic
countries but also large donors such as the United States and France are selective; France has
ﬁve As and the United States and Germany are selective in all 10 sectors. As in Sawada et al.
(2007), our results suggest that Canada, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom also are
selective and allocate more assistance to poor countries.
As long as the number of sectors that are selective is concerned, our results suggest that
Japan is least selective among major donors; Japan is selective only in six sectors.11 Clearly, the
number of As and Bs in Table 12 does not necessarily reﬂect the donor’s overall aid quality. This
paper focuses on the 10 sectors that are closely related to the MDGs and they cover less than
20 percent of total bilateral aid. Most of the sectors are related to direct assistance to the poor;
aid for economic infrastructure, which can play the key role in reducing poverty by promoting
growth, is neglected in this paper. For donors who focus on economic infrastructure, Table 12
does not provide fair assessment. Note that Japan has traditionally been strong in giving aid for
infrastructural development (Cassen and Associates, 1994, p.206). Sawada et al. (2007) show
that Japan is selective on poverty using grant data. In fact, our results also show that Japan is
selective in sectors with a large share of grant such as food, health and basic education. Note
that these sectors account for about 10 percent of total bilateral aid, and Japan is one of the
largest donors in these three sectors as shown in Table 1. Thus, while the number of As and Bs
11Japan has As for basic nutrition and infectious disease control. Note that aid for basic health includes aid for
these two sectors.
11is relatively small, Japan provides a large amount of highly quality aid in the speciﬁc areas.
Using more recent data does not alter the qualitative results above. Table 13 shows the
results for the 1990-1994 and 2000-2004 (after the Millennium Declaration) subsamples. We
report the results for aid for four sectors (the MDGs indicators in these sectors are available
for both subsamples).12 The results do not provide clear evidence that the selectivity of aid
increases recently in these sectors; the United States and the Netherlands become selective
in telecommunications (purpose 10), Japan and Germany become selective in basic education
(purpose 5), and France becomes selective in general environmental protection (purpose 9).
However, as in purposes 9 and 10, donors do not necessarily increase the selectivity of aid even
after the Millennium Declaration.
At this time, it is diﬃcult to explain why some donors are more selective than others. For
all 22 donors, the MDGs play some role in determining aid allocation; however, all the donors
except the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have no formal model for aid allocation (Jones
et al., 2005). By coincidence, they are very selective as shown in Table 12.
4 Conclusions
This paper evaluates donors by investigating which donors are selective in which sectors. While
many studies focus on selectivity, none of them uses sectoral data on aid. The contribution of this
paper is to investigate whether aid meets the recipient’s needs using sectoral data. Examining
aid for 10 (groups of) sectors among more than 200 distinct purposes may not be enough to
evaluate overall donor performance. However, the 10 sectors are closely related to the main
targets of the MDGs that come from the Millennium Declaration signed by the 189 members of
the United Nations; it is undeniable that aid for these 10 sectors is most urgently needed.
Our main results are as follows. The majority of donors are selective in each of the 10
sectors. Most large donors (except Japan) are selective in more than nine sectors. In this sense,
the donors give high-quality aid. However, there is no clear evidence that the selectivity of aid
12Unfortunately, observations for relatively new and small donors (Spain, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, New
Zealand, Portugal) do not include aid ﬂows before 1995 in most sectors. The same is true in some sectors such as
STD control including HIV/AIDS because of data availability for the indicators.
12has increased after the Millennium Declaration in 2000. It should be noted that we evaluate
donors based on selectivity not on the impact of aid. A further direction of this study will be to
evaluate donor performance based on the eﬀectiveness of aid and to examine whether selective
donors contribute to the achievement of the MDGs.
13Data Appendix
A. List of donors
code name share (percent) code name share (percent)
AUS Australia 2.0 GRC Greece 0.1
AUT Austria 0.8 IRL Ireland 0.2
BEL Belgium 1.1 ITA Italy 3.2
CAN Canada 3.6 JPN Japan 22.6
CHE Switzerland 1.6 LUX Luxembourg 0.1
DEU Germany 10.7 NLD Netherlands 5.3
DNK Denmark 1.9 NOR Norway 1.9
ESP Spain 1.6 NZL New Zealand 0.1
FIN Finland 0.6 PRT Portugal 0.3
FRA France 8.2 SWE Sweden 3.7
GBR United Kingdom 7.1 USA United States 23.3
Note: The member countries of the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) are
listed. Share is calculated using the cumulative bilateral aid (ODA commitments, constant
USD2004) 1973-2005 from OECD.stat (http://stats.oecd.org/).
B. The selected targets from the MDGs
Target 1: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than
one dollar a day
Target 2: Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suﬀer from hunger
Target 3: Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to
complete a full course of primary schooling
Target 4: Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005,
and in all levels of education no later than 2015
14Target 5: Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-ﬁve mortality rate
Target 6: Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio
Target 7: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
Target 8: Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major
diseases
Target 9: Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and pro-
grams and reverse the loss of environmental resources
Target 10: Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking
water and basic sanitation
Target 18: In cooperation with the private sector, make available the beneﬁts of new tech-
nologies, especially information and communications
C. The CRS purpose codes and the MDGs indicators
1. Food (code 52010) Target 2 indicators:
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)
Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)
2. Health (code 12110-12282) Target 5 and Target 6 indicators:
Births attended by skilled health staﬀ (% of total)
Mortality rate, under-5 (per 1,000)
Mortality rate, infant (per 1,000 live births)
Immunization, measles (% of children ages 12-23 months)
3. Water supply and sanitation (code 14010-14081) Target 10 indicators:
Improved water source (% of population with access)
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access)
154. Basic nutrition (code 12240) Target 2 indicators:
Malnutrition prevalence, weight for age (% of children under 5)
Prevalence of undernourishment (% of population)
5. Basic education (code 11220-11240) Target 3 indicators:
School enrollment, primary (% gross)
Persistence to grade 5, total (% of cohort)
Literacy rate, youth total (% of people ages 15-24)
6. Women in development (code 42010) Target 4 indicators:
Ratio of girls to boys in primary and secondary education (%)
Ratio of young literate females to males (% ages 15-24)
Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament (%)
7. STD control including HIV/AIDS (code 13040) Target 7 indicators:
Female adults with HIV (% of population ages 15-49 with HIV)
Prevalence of HIV, total (% of population ages 15-49)
8. Infectious disease control (code 12250) Target 8 indicators:
Incidence of tuberculosis (per 100,000 people)
Tuberculosis cases detected under DOTS (%)
9. General environmental protection (code 41010-41082) Target 9 indicators:
Forest area (% of land area)
GDP per unit of energy use (constant 2000 PPP per kg of oil equivalent)
CO2 emissions (metric tons per capita)
10. Telecommunications (code 22020) Target 18 indicators:
Telephone mainlines (per 1,000 people)
Note: Five-year averages of each indicator are used for estimation. All the variables are obtained
from the World Bank’s WDI CD-ROM.
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18Table 1: The ﬁve largest donors in each sector: cumulative bilateral aid 1973-2005
Purpose of Aid
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
largest USA USA JPN USA USA NLD USA USA JPN JPN
(69) (23) (36) (45) (21) (21) (51) (36) (35) (43)
2nd JPN JPN DEU NLD GBR NOR GBR GBR USA FRA
(7) (14) (16) (13) (19) (17) (17) (21) (16) (18)
3rd GBR GBR USA JPN NLD CAN SWE JPN DEU DEU
(6) (11) (11) (8) (11) (15) (6) (8) (9) (11)
4th CAN FRA FRA SWE JPN USA CAN CAN NLD ITA
(6) (6) (8) (7) (11) (11) (5) (5) (9) (5)
5th DEU NLD NLD CAN SWE DNK NLD DEU FRA CAN
(4) (6) (5) (6) (8) (8) (5) (4) (4) (4)
Sector’s share in total bilateral aid (percent)
5.5 3.2 5.0 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.7 0.5 1.4 1.7
Note: Figures in parentheses are the donor’s share (percent) in total bilateral aid for each
sector. See Data Appendix A for the list of donor codes and Data Appendix C for the list of
aid purposes.
19Table 2: Estimation results for the ﬁve largest donors: Food
USA JPN GBR CAN DEU
malnutrition -0.052 -0.401 -0.087 -0.194 -0.062
(0.027)¤ (0.150)¤¤¤ (0.114) (0.110)¤ (0.046)
GDP per capita -0.003 -0.028 -0.087 -0.000 -0.016
(0.004) (0.014)¤¤ (0.040)¤¤ (0.008) (0.006)¤¤¤
population 0.003 -0.019 0.002 0.009 0.003
(0.002)¤ (0.006)¤¤¤ (0.008) (0.003)¤¤¤ (0.002)
democracy -0.002 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 0.000
(0.001)¤¤ (0.004) (0.007) (0.002)¤ (0.002)
observations 159 159 134 162 134
Note: The Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used. The dependent variable is food aid
(code 52010). Malnutrition and GDP per capita are measured by deviations from the worst
environment. Instruments are the lagged values of malnutrition and GDP per capita. Figures
in parentheses are standard errors. Intragroup correlation is adjusted. The superscripts *, **,
*** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively. See Data Appendix A for the list of
donor codes.
20Table 3: Estimation results for the ﬁve largest donors: Health
USA JPN GBR FRA NLD
infant mortality -0.037 0.128 0.139 -0.028 0.027
(0.022)¤ (0.034)¤¤¤ (0.055)¤¤¤ (0.026) (0.031)
GDP per capita -0.006 -0.019 -0.046 -0.002 -0.021
(0.002)¤¤¤ (0.004)¤¤¤ (0.012)¤¤¤ (0.003) (0.005)¤¤¤
population 0.004 0.007 0.011 0.004 0.006
(0.001)¤¤¤ (0.001)¤¤¤ (0.003)¤¤¤ (0.002)¤¤¤ (0.001)¤¤¤
democracy -0.002 0.001 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001)¤¤¤ (0.001) (0.003)¤¤ (0.001) (0.001)
observations 536 536 536 536 536
Note: The Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used. The dependent variable is aid for
health (code 12110-12282). Infant mortality and GDP per capita are measured by deviations
from the worst environment. Instruments are the lagged values of infant mortality and GDP
per capita. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Intragroup correlation is adjusted. The
superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively. See Data Appendix
A for the list of donor codes.
21Table 4: Estimation results for the ﬁve largest donors: Water supply and sanitation
JPN DEU USA FRA NLD
water source 0.009 0.009 0.205 0.002 0.016
(0.008) (0.007) (0.130) (0.010) (0.013)
GDP per capita -0.002 -0.007 -0.064 -0.003 -0.020
(0.004) (0.003)¤¤¤ (0.036)¤ (0.004) (0.006)¤¤¤
population 0.012 0.006 0.025 0.005 0.013
(0.003)¤¤¤ (0.002)¤¤¤ (0.015)¤ (0.001)¤¤¤ (0.004)¤¤¤
democracy 0.000 -0.000 -0.008 0.003 -0.006
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005)¤ (0.002) (0.003)¤¤
observations 210 210 210 210 210
Note: The Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used. The dependent variable is aid for
water supply and sanitation (code 14010-14081). Improved water source and GDP per capita
are measured by deviations from the worst environment. Instruments are the lagged value of
GDP per capita. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Intragroup correlation is adjusted.
The superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively. See Data
Appendix A for the list of donor codes.
22Table 5: Estimation results for the ﬁve largest donors: Basic nutrition
USA NLD JPN SWE CAN
malnutrition 0.014 -0.289 -2.392 -0.076 -0.047
(0.023) (0.174)¤ (1.273)¤ (0.098) (0.081)
GDP per capita -0.010 -0.016 0.403 0.020 -0.018
(0.003)¤¤¤ (0.032) (0.178)¤¤ (0.536) (0.012)
population 0.004 0.030 0.083 0.073 0.013
(0.002)¤¤ (0.020) (0.083) (0.033)¤¤ (0.006)¤¤
democracy -0.003 -0.020 0.051 0.007 0.003
(0.001)¤¤ (0.015) (0.075) (0.021) (0.005)
observations 159 159 159 299 159
Note: The Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used. The dependent variable is aid for
basic nutrition (code 12240). Malnutrition and GDP per capita are measured by deviations from
the worst environment. Instruments are the lagged values of malnutrition and GDP per capita
(for Sweden, GDP per capita only). Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Intragroup
correlation is adjusted. The superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent,
respectively. See Data Appendix A for the list of donor codes.
23Table 6: Estimation results for the ﬁve largest donors: Basic education
USA GBR NLD JPN SWE
school enrollment 0.013 0.232 0.028 0.011 0.119
(0.019) (0.062)¤¤¤ (0.030) (0.017) (0.062)¤
GDP per capita -0.020 -0.060 -0.034 -0.024 -0.066
(0.007)¤¤¤ (0.015)¤¤¤ (0.008)¤¤¤ (0.005)¤¤¤ (0.020)¤¤¤
population 0.009 0.028 0.010 0.006 0.016
(0.004)¤¤¤ (0.012)¤¤ (0.003)¤¤¤ (0.003)¤¤ (0.008)¤¤
democracy -0.002 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003)¤¤¤ (0.002)¤¤¤ (0.007)
observations 237 237 237 237 237
Note: The Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used. The dependent variable is aid for
basic education (code 11220-11240). School enrollment and GDP per capita are measured by
deviations from the worst environment. Instruments are the lagged values of school enrollment
and GDP per capita. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Intragroup correlation is
adjusted. The superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively. See
Data Appendix A for the list of donor codes.
24Table 7: Estimation results for the ﬁve largest donors: Women in development
NLD NOR CAN USA DNK
girls/boys in school 0.059 0.065 0.075 -0.020 0.101
(0.033)¤ (0.028)¤¤ (0.044)¤ (0.082) (0.136)
GDP per capita -0.018 -0.019 -0.021 -0.022 -0.087
(0.006)¤¤¤ (0.005)¤¤¤ (0.008)¤¤¤ (0.011)¤¤ (0.031)¤¤¤
population 0.010 0.009 0.024 0.019 0.068
(0.003)¤¤¤ (0.003)¤¤¤ (0.007)¤¤¤ (0.009)¤¤ (0.021)¤¤¤
democracy -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.013 -0.029
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.008) (0.013)¤¤
observations 184 184 184 184 184
Note: The Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used. The dependent variable is aid for
women in development (code 42010). Ratio of girls to boys in school and GDP per capita are
measured by deviations from the worst environment. Instruments are the lagged values of ratio
of girls to boys in school and GDP per capita. Figures in parentheses are standard errors.
Intragroup correlation is adjusted. The superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1
percent, respectively. See Data Appendix A for the list of donor codes.
25Table 8: Estimation results for the ﬁve largest donors: STD control including HIV/AIDS
USA GBR SWE CAN NLD
HIV prevalence -0.045 -0.185 -0.140 -0.106 -0.090
(0.014)¤¤¤ (0.059)¤¤¤ (0.033)¤¤¤ (0.025)¤¤¤ (0.016)¤¤¤
GDP per capita -0.009 -0.037 -0.021 -0.020 -0.013
(0.002)¤¤¤ (0.014)¤¤¤ (0.006)¤¤¤ (0.005)¤¤¤ (0.004)¤¤¤
population 0.005 0.031 0.013 0.014 0.007
(0.001)¤¤¤ (0.009)¤¤¤ (0.003)¤¤¤ (0.003)¤¤¤ (0.002)¤¤¤
democracy -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.000 -0.004
(0.001)¤ (0.003) (0.002)¤¤ (0.002) (0.001)¤¤¤
observations 115 115 115 115 115
Note: The Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used. The dependent variable is aid
for STD control including HIV/AIDS (code 13040). HIV prevalence and GDP per capita are
measured by deviations from the worst environment. Instruments are the lagged value of GDP
per capita. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Intragroup correlation is adjusted. The
superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively. See Data Appendix
A for the list of donor codes.
26Table 9: Estimation results for the ﬁve largest donors: Infectious disease control
USA GBR JPN CAN DEU
tuberculosis -0.025 -0.374 -0.342 -0.115 -0.055
(0.013)¤¤ (0.146)¤¤¤ (0.200)¤ (0.054)¤¤ (0.080)
GDP per capita -0.009 -0.080 -0.071 -0.020 -0.032
(0.002)¤¤¤ (0.024)¤¤¤ (0.023)¤¤¤ (0.008)¤¤¤ (0.015)¤¤
population 0.005 0.057 0.040 0.019 0.028
(0.001)¤¤¤ (0.022)¤¤¤ (0.017)¤¤ (0.006)¤¤¤ (0.015)¤
democracy -0.002 -0.000 -0.010 -0.011 0.000
(0.001)¤¤¤ (0.009) (0.007) (0.004)¤¤¤ (0.005)
observations 255 255 255 255 140
Note: The Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used. The dependent variable is aid
for infectious disease control (code 12250). Incidence of tuberculosis and GDP per capita are
measured by deviations from the worst environment. Instruments are the lagged value of GDP
per capita. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Intragroup correlation is adjusted. The
superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively. See Data Appendix
A for the list of donor codes.
27Table 10: Estimation results for the ﬁve largest donors: General environmental protection
JPN USA DEU NLD FRA
GDP/energy use 0.051 0.012 0.034 0.026 0.023
(0.018)¤¤¤ (0.006)¤¤ (0.016)¤¤ (0.012)¤¤ (0.009)¤¤¤
GDP per capita -0.016 -0.014 -0.030 -0.041 -0.013
(0.012) (0.004)¤¤¤ (0.013)¤¤ (0.013)¤¤¤ (0.005)¤¤¤
population 0.041 0.004 0.026 0.013 0.006
(0.011)¤¤¤ (0.002)¤ (0.009)¤¤¤ (0.004)¤¤¤ (0.003)¤¤
democracy -0.003 -0.003 -0.009 -0.013 0.003
(0.005) (0.002)¤ (0.006) (0.005)¤¤¤ (0.002)
observations 405 339 405 405 405
Note: The Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used. The dependent variable is aid for
general environmental protection (code 41010-41082). GDP per unit of energy use and GDP
per capita are measured by deviations from the worst environment. Instruments are the lagged
value of GDP per capita. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Intragroup correlation is
adjusted. The superscripts *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively. See
Data Appendix A for the list of donor codes.
28Table 11: Estimation results for the ﬁve largest donors: Telecommunications
JPN FRA DEU ITA CAN
telephone mainlines 0.009 -0.014 0.020 -0.021 0.013
(0.008) (0.004)¤¤¤ (0.029) (0.034) (0.010)
GDP per capita -0.027 0.002 -0.111 0.020 -0.034
(0.015)¤ (0.009) (0.066)¤ (0.072) (0.019)¤
population 0.019 0.008 0.044 0.059 0.031
(0.004)¤¤¤ (0.003)¤¤¤ (0.014)¤¤¤ (0.017)¤¤¤ (0.009)¤¤¤
democracy 0.002 0.001 -0.004 -0.005 -0.009
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.015) (0.003)¤¤¤
observations 591 591 591 591 591
Note: The Tobit model with endogenous regressors is used. The dependent variable is aid for
telecommunications (code 22020). Telephone mainlines and GDP per capita are measured by
deviations from the worst environment. Instruments are the lagged value of GDP per capita.
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. Intragroup correlation is adjusted. The superscripts
*, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at 10, 5, 1 percent, respectively. See Data Appendix A for the
list of donor codes.
29Table 12: Selectivity of aid for 22 donors
Purpose of Aid # of
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 A+B (A)
AUS A B B B B A A 7 (3)
AUT B B A B B A B 7 (2)
BEL A B B B B A B 7 (2)
CAN A B B B B A A B B 9 (3)
CHE A B B A B B A A B 9 (4)
DEU A B B B B B A B B B 10(2)
DNK A B B A B B A B B B 10(3)
ESP A B A B A A 6 (4)
FIN B A B B A A B 7 (3)
FRA B A A A A B A 7 (5)
GBR B B B A B B A A B 9 (3)
GRC B A B B 4 (1)
IRL B B A B B B A A B B 10(3)
ITA A B B B B B A B B 9 (2)
JPN A B A B A B 6 (3)
LUX B A A B 4 (2)
NLD B B B A B B A A B A 10(4)
NOR A B B A B B A A B B 10(4)
NZL B B A A A 5 (3)
PRT A A B A B B 6 (3)
SWE B B B B A B B B 8 (1)
USA A A B B B B A A B B 10(4)
Note: “A” represents ¯1 < 0 at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level for at least one indicator. “B”
represents the case where ¯2 is signiﬁcantly negative when ¯1 is not signiﬁcantly negative. See
Data Appendix A for the list of donor codes and Data Appendix C for the list of aid purposes.
30Table 13: Selectivity of aid after the Millennium Declaration: the nine largest donors
purpose 2 5 9 10
year 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
USA A B B B B B B
JPN B B B
DEU B B B A B
FRA A A A A B
GBR B B B B B B
NLD B B B B B B A
SWE B B B B B B
CAN A A A B B B
ITA B B A B B
Note: “A” represents ¯1 < 0 at the 10 percent signiﬁcance level for at least one indicator. “B”
represents the case where ¯2 is signiﬁcantly negative when ¯1 is not signiﬁcantly negative. See
Data Appendix A for the list of donor codes and Data Appendix C for the list of aid purposes.
31